There are many criteria for judging whether an army is strong or not. In addition to the quantity and quality of soldiers and the quantity and quality of weapons, the level of combat guiding ideology, tactical level, and the strength of fighting will are more important to some extent. , especially in a battle where the weak defeats the strong.
This year marks the 70th anniversary of the start of the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea. There are many articles and film and television works about the Volunteer Army. However, from the current point of view, most of the focus is on the spiritual level, and there is not much research on specific command and tactics. In fact, it is necessary to explore the combat command art of the Volunteer Army. The strength of the Volunteer Army is not limited to the spiritual level.
The Volunteer Army is a very tactical army and pays great attention to the summary of experience and lessons when the enemy is strong and we are weak. However, in many cases, the disparity in strength between the enemy and ourselves limits the volunteers' combat capabilities.
For example, Li Qiwei of the US Army was praised as a famous general after he discovered the characteristics of the Volunteer Army's "Worship Offensive" and "Moonlight Offensive". Many people also regard the "Sarah Offensive" and the "Moonlight Offensive" as the weaknesses of the Volunteer Army.
To be honest, the Volunteer Army's "Worship Offensive" and "Moon Night Offensive" are not weaknesses in themselves. The "Worship Offensive" is an attack operation carried out by the Volunteer Army to concentrate its forces as much as possible when the logistics supplies are weak; while the "Moon Night Offensive" is organized by the Volunteer Army by choosing a time window when the US air artillery firepower is relatively weak at night. offensive action.
This is actually a tactical adjustment made by the Volunteer Army based on the advantages and disadvantages of the enemy and our two armies under the condition of limited logistics, no air supremacy, and a comprehensive disadvantage in ground firepower, so as to offset the US military's air artillery firepower advantage as much as possible and reduce the fighting between the enemy and our armies. Pulled into the close combat and night combat that our army is better at.
Many people look down upon the "Sarah Offensive" and the "Moonlight Offensive". So if you were the commander of the Volunteer Army at that time, how would you have carried out combat operations under those circumstances?
We must know that the opponent's firepower is dozens, even hundreds of times, that of ours. In addition to the response measures of the ancestors of the Volunteer Army, can people who question and ridicule come up with more effective response methods?
Some people always hold double standards when evaluating the combat effectiveness of the Chinese and American armed forces. After the US military discovered the weaknesses of the Volunteer Army and made tactical improvements, it enthusiastically pursued the US military; but the Volunteer Army discovered the weaknesses of the US military and based on its own strengths and weaknesses. After carrying out tactical responses, this group of people became sarcastic and sarcastic.
I would like to ask, is such double standards really appropriate? Is it really rational, objective, and fair?
Any discussion of tactics cannot be separated from the understanding of the basic strength of the two armies. If the technical equipment of the Volunteer Army and the US Army are exchanged, according to the combat principles of the US Army, is it time to reach the surrender standard?
I would like to ask what effective tactics the US military can come up with if we set up an environment where the US military is extremely short of logistical supplies, has no air superiority, forced marches on foot, and has to attack its opponents with dozens or hundreds of times the firepower. In other words, if the "famous general" Li Qiwei is placed in such an environment, can he perform better than the generals of the Volunteer Army?
So whether Ridgway is more powerful or the United States' overall strength is stronger, these issues need to be clarified.
And there is another obvious fact that the U.S. military realized the weaknesses of the Volunteer Army several months after the official war between the two armies. The weaknesses of the Volunteer Army exist objectively. It depends on how soon the other side discovers it. Obviously, the U.S. military did not discover it early. In fact, after the Volunteer Army fought against the US military for the first time, they formed an understanding of the US military's combat capabilities and made corresponding tactical improvements.
The so-called "Worship Offensive" and "Moonlight Offensive" are actually tactical adjustments that the Volunteer Army has already made based on the US military and its own advantages and disadvantages. Such attack methods are obviously not common in previous liberation wars. So according to some people's standards of praising Li Qiwei, shouldn't the volunteers be praised more?
Therefore, based on an objective analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of both the enemy and ourselves and the flexibility to make tactical changes, the Volunteer Army clearly surpasses the U.S. Army. And it is not beyond the level of a little bit, but beyond the level of several streets. After all, the resources in the hands of the volunteers are not even a fraction of the U.S. military, and the latter should have more room to play.
But the fact is exactly the opposite. Not to mention the formal battle between the two armies, that is to say, before the formal war with the US military begins, through some of the intelligence we can obtain, we actually already have a basic understanding of the combat characteristics of the US military. At that time, the US military could also obtain a lot of information about the characteristics of our army's combat operations from Chiang Kai-shek's army, but it obviously did not think that much.
For example, before entering North Korea, the Volunteer Army had clearly realized the advantages of the US Air Force and ground heavy artillery and tank units. In the decision-making process for entering Korea, the deployment of the Soviet Air Force and the replacement of Soviet weapons were the main points of discussion. It was only later that the U.S. and South Korean troops advanced too quickly toward the Yalu River, and the Volunteer Army had to go into battle without air force cover or new weapons.
Despite this, in the preparations before going to war, the Volunteer Army had strengthened its armaments as much as possible and conducted necessary training for air defense and anti-tank operations; after entering North Korea, the Volunteer Army strictly abided by air defense disciplines, and large units marched and Operations, etc. are all responses to the advantages of the US military.
Due to the huge disparity in strength between the enemy and ourselves, the volunteers were worried about whether they could win the battle with the US military when they first entered the DPRK. In the initial combat plan, it was even focused on attacking the Korean army first, and the US military was not listed as the primary target. But if the U.S. military comes to your doorstep, it will hit you without fail.
The first large-scale confrontation between the Chinese and American armies on the Korean battlefield took place in Unsan. The fighting parties were the main force of the 39th Volunteer Army and the main force of the 1st Cavalry Division of the U.S. Army. At the same time, the U.S. Army also had the most powerful 1st Division of the Korean Army participating in the battle.
When the Volunteer Army initially planned the Yunshan Operation, its main target was the 1st Division of the Korean Army.
The 1st Division of the Korean Army was included in the combat sequence of the 1st Army of the U.S. Army because of its strong combat effectiveness and ease of cooperation with the U.S. Army.
General Milburn of the 1st U.S. Army admired Bai Shanye, the commander of the 1st Division of the Korean Army, and even allocated a mixed heavy artillery regiment and a tank battalion of the U.S. Army to the Korean Army. In war, it is very common for the Korean army to be assigned to the US military, but the US military to be assigned to the Korean army is obviously a big exception.
On October 25, 1950, the 1st Division of the Korean Army was blocked by the 360th Regiment of the 120th Division of the 40th Army of the Volunteer Army. Subsequently, the 39th Army of the Volunteer Army gradually took over the defense of the 360th Regiment, preparing to gather the strength of the entire army to annihilate the Korean Army.
The Korean army did not understand the situation at first and continued to attack the 39th Army when it was gathering. The 116th Division, the main division of the 39th Army, immediately made tactical adjustments according to the characteristics of the opponent at the beginning of the encounter:
1: In terms of troop deployment, the main force of the blocking force was evacuated deep into the mountains, leaving only the combat team in an easily observed place on the top of the mountain;
Two: The fortifications are built on the mountainside and foot of the mountain instead of on the top of the mountain, which not only facilitates my use of firepower, but also confuses the enemy;
Three: Anti-gun holes must be dug in trenches and single-man bunkers;
Four: Telephone lines are buried underground to prevent them from being discovered and blown down.
This is the tactical change that the 116th Division of the 39th Army made immediately after its first encounter with the South Korean and American coalition forces, the 1st Division of the Korean Army. What is the main force? This is called the main force.
All deployments focus on weakening the opponent's air force, heavy artillery, and tank advantages, and drawing them into the close combat and night combat that our army is good at, playing the role of leveraging strengths and avoiding weaknesses. This is the embodiment of combat level.
At that time, the Korean army was equipped with more than 50 M26 heavy tanks from the 6th Tank Battalion of the US Army. The tanks guided the infantry to attack. The 116th Division did not have any decent anti-tank weapons, so it used the division's 75mm mountain cannon to fire at a distance of 500 meters, firing continuously. 26 artillery shells, 7 hits, and 2 US tanks were damaged.
Mountain artillery anti-tank is helpless, but powerful troops will not sit back and wait for death just because they don’t have weapons at hand. The huge impact of the mountain artillery shells exploding on the tanks also surprised the US and South Korean troops. Baek Shan, commander of the 1st Division of the Korean Army Ye specifically mentioned in his memoirs that the US tanks were destroyed by the Volunteer Army, but he did not know that the Volunteer Army used mountain artillery to hit it, and thought it was hit with armor-piercing bullets.
This style of play cannot actually damage many US tanks, but it can disrupt the opponent's infantry-tank coordination rhythm, which achieves its goal.
The blocking of the 116th Division of the 39th Army was to cover the deployment of the main force of the army. In order to encircle and annihilate this elite Korean division, the 39th Army not only concentrated 8 infantry regiments, but also obtained 7 companies of the 26th Artillery Regiment and 3 25th Artillery Regiment. With the support of the company, 2 anti-aircraft artillery battalions, and the military rocket artillery battalion, it is planned to launch a general offensive at 19:30 on November 1.
This battle 70 years ago was full of uncertainty, because on the day the Volunteers were preparing to attack, the 8th Cavalry Regiment Combat Team of the 1st Cavalry Division of the US Army arrived at Yunshan. When the U.S. and South Korean troops were changing defenses, the Volunteers thought they were about to retreat, so they launched the attack nearly three hours in advance.
Although equipped with artillery, the Volunteer Army is still at an absolute disadvantage in terms of firepower. Artillery preparation can only play a role in the initial attack, and most of the attacks must be completed by infantry.
The U.S. heavy artillery regiment attached to the 1st Division of the Korean Army includes the 78th Anti-aircraft Battalion (10 90mm anti-aircraft guns), the 9th Artillery Battalion (18 155mm howitzers), and the 2nd Heavy Mortar Battalion (18 107 mm mortar), it also has a division artillery battalion (105 mm howitzer) and a US tank battalion.
According to the memory of Bai Shanye, the commander of the 1st Division of the Korean Army, after being attacked by the Volunteer Army, he ordered his artillery unit to fire more than 13,000 heavy artillery shells in one breath to cover the escape of the main force of the unit.
As a result, the main force of the 1st Division of the Korean Army and the accompanying U.S. troops fled. The 8th Cavalry Regiment Combat Team of the 1st U.S. Cavalry Division and part of the covering Korean Army were unlucky, losing most of them. The 5th U.S. Cavalry Regiment was also attacked during the rescue. A blow, and all the energy is lost.
This was the first battle between the Chinese and American armies on the Korean battlefield. The 39th Army of the Volunteer Army defeated the Korean Army and the US Army, and won the battle. After winning this battle, Mr. Peng was very happy.
At the campaign summary meeting, President Peng said:
The 39th Army fought well against the 1st U.S. Cavalry Division in Yunshan. At first, we were worried that we would suffer a loss if we fought the U.S. Army without air superiority. It now appears that this difficulty can be overcome. We have the magic weapon for close combat and night fighting. We can still fight and win the war even if we don’t have planes or tanks or artillery. The U.S. military is nothing special. We not only fought against the puppet troops, but also fought against the U.S. ace army, which was the 1st U.S. Cavalry Division formed when Washington founded the country! This famous American army has never suffered a defeat. This time it was defeated at the hands of our 39th Army!
President Peng is not unreasonable. The Battle of Yunshan not only solved the problem of whether the volunteers can fight against the US military, but also solved the problem of whether they can win if they win directly.
This battle had a huge inspiring effect on the entire army. At the same time, it also gave the Volunteers a more direct and clear understanding of the combat characteristics of the US military, which would be of great benefit to the Volunteers' subsequent operations against the United States.
During the Ruyunshan battle, General Wang Yang, commander of the main division of the 39th Army, made an assessment of the combat effectiveness of the US and South Korean aces after the battle:
Thoughts on the 1st Cavalry Division, the ace division of the US military and the ever-victorious division:
It has advanced weapons and equipment, strong mobility, and is supported by powerful air force, artillery, and tank firepower. The infantry mainly relies on the powerful army firepower and the cover of tanks to conduct offensive and defensive operations, striving to overwhelm the enemy with firepower and armor and win victory.
(U.S. Army) mainly conducts offensive operations during the day in order to give full play to the advantages of its technical equipment. Basically do not launch attacks at night and try to avoid fighting with our army at night. Try to avoid close combat with our troops and avoid decisive battles with bayonets and grenades. During the night battle, when our troops entered the range of submachine guns and grenades, the (U.S. military) did not put up a stubborn resistance, discarded their weapons and retreated, and even fled in all directions. They rarely had the spirit of hand-to-hand combat with bayonets, and tried every possible means to scatter and escape, so they were not easily captured by me in large numbers. .
Opinions on the combat characteristics of the 1st Division of the South Korean Army:
The 1st Division of the Korean Army is the division with the strongest combat effectiveness of the Korean Army. All services and arms coordinate offensive and defensive operations to a certain level. Every battle is supported by the U.S. Air Force, tanks, and artillery.
During the attack, with the fire support of the US military, small teams followed the tanks to carry out attacks in turns, but did not make a strong attack; when defending, there was no stubborn resistance. When we were in close combat, except for the dead and wounded prisoners, the rest abandoned their weapons and equipment and fled. Because they spoke the same language as the local Korean people and were familiar with the mountainous terrain, some of them dispersed and fled and then regrouped at designated locations in the rear, making it difficult for me to capture a large number of them.
Obviously, from General Wang Yang’s summary, it is not difficult to see the advantages and disadvantages of the US military.
Why did the volunteers attack at night? Isn't it just to avoid the powerful firepower of the US military as much as possible and take advantage of the close combat and night combat that we are good at? Why can the Volunteer Army only maintain its attack intensity for about a week? Without air superiority, ammunition supplies cannot fall from the sky in vain!
To put it simply, the Volunteer Army understood its own advantages and disadvantages and the advantages and disadvantages of the US military very early and clearly. However, the Americans were slower to react and did not come to their senses until the third battle. But by this time, the war was over. The basic victory has been established.
The Americans were just a little slow to respond, but they were not stupid. They summarized the characteristics of the Volunteer Army, which is weak in logistics and firepower, but strong in infantry combat effectiveness, especially in close combat and night combat. Realizing that the US military's advantages lay in the air force, artillery and armor, not in the infantry, it subsequently launched the so-called "magnetic tactics" to continuously weaken the volunteers with mobility and artillery fire.
At the same time, the U.S. military placed the Korean army on the front line, using the losses of the Korean infantry to reduce the losses of the U.S. infantry; in addition, each unit adopted the tactics of advancing and retreating in parallel to deal with the volunteers' insertion and segmentation tactics.
With the resources as abundant as the US military, and months after the war started, any general who has received normal training can make the above-mentioned adjustments to maximize strengths and avoid weaknesses as long as he is not an idiot. Therefore, the evaluation of Li Qiwei's command level is only qualified. After all, he relies more on the advantage of the United States' comprehensive national strength, and even with this advantage, he did not achieve an overwhelming victory on the battlefield.
People today know that the Volunteer Army did not fight well in the Fifth Battle, but the biggest result of the US military in this battle was only a heavy damage to the 180th Division of the Volunteer Army.
As we all know, the 180th Division is basically the weakest among the volunteers. During the Fifth Battle, the US military participated in the battle with the strongest lineup. At that time, the US military not only had a very clear understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of both sides, but also mobilized a large number of veterans. However, this was not the case It did not achieve greater results. Otherwise, why did the mobile war end after the fifth battle?
The U.S. military itself knows very well that it can fight like this on the basis that it has absolute air supremacy, absolute firepower advantage, mobility advantage, supply advantage, and communication advantage, and it has an understanding of the opponent's combat characteristics and exerts its full strength. You must know that the US military's own statistics of casualties in the fifth battle were more than 10,000. In addition, there were more than 30,000 casualties of Korean troops and thousands of other coalition forces. This battle was not easy.
So later in the negotiations, why did the United States emphasize its maritime and air superiority but did not dare to mention its land warfare superiority?
Some people may have questions. Didn't you say that the Volunteer Army knows itself and the enemy and has flexible tactics? Why didn't you say change your tactics at this point?
Who said it wasn't changed? The allocation of troops, heavy in the front and light in the rear, and the allocation of firepower, such as heavy in the front and light in the rear, are all tactical changes, but the disparity in strength between the enemy and ourselves also exists objectively. Without improvement in logistics supply, failure to update technical equipment, and failure to strengthen air defense forces, it is impossible for the volunteers to have enough space to display. This is a disadvantage that is difficult to bridge for a while due to the gap in national strength between the two sides at that time, and it will take a certain amount of time to improve.
But on the battlefield, can you tell the enemy to stop fighting and give me a few months to update equipment and strengthen combat power? That's obviously impossible.
During the few months when the U.S. military took the initiative, to put it bluntly, it implemented Van Fleet's ammunition-heavy style of play on the front line and carried out strangulation warfare against the volunteers' rear areas. But the Volunteer Army built a fortification system with tunnel defense as the core on the front line; and built a steel transportation line in the rear that was indestructible.
In this way, the air superiority and firepower advantage of the US military were greatly offset. As the firepower and logistics of our Volunteer Army gradually improved, you can look at the offensive and defensive battles from 1952 to 1953. Who had the advantage? U.S. military generals such as Ridgway, Van Fleet, Clark, and Taylor were unable to come up with an effective response strategy.
To put it simply, the art of war is to exploit strengths and avoid weaknesses. The Volunteer Army's great victory in entering North Korea in the early stage was based on this aspect. The U.S. Army's initiative in the late stage of mobile warfare and the early stage of positional warfare was also based on this foundation. The Volunteer Army's advantage in the middle and late stages of positional warfare was also based on this. Performance also benefits from this.
However, in the later stages of the war, the U.S. military really had no choice. Its own air artillery firepower advantage had been overtaken by the opponent, and even Van Fleet's ammunition had lost its effect. During the offensive and defensive positions, they had to engage in close combat and night battles with the Volunteer Army. In this regard, the Volunteer Army's combat advantage was difficult to catch up with, and the US military would not be able to continue this battle.
Therefore, since the Battle of Tingzishan in 1953, the US military has stopped taking the initiative to attack; and the arrogant Korean army has been tempered since the Battle of Jincheng.
Therefore, General Peng later said this: The Korean battlefield is a training ground for our army to compete with the US military. After this battle of blood and fire, it is wise for the US military to sign a ceasefire now, otherwise, we will be driven to the Imjin River to feed the bastards!
Mr. Peng's more famous saying is: The history of imperialism being able to conquer a country or a nation by setting up a few cannons in the East is gone forever!
This was a victory that cannot be overestimated, not only at the time, but even years later we are enjoying the fruits of this victory. People now should know more about how our ancestors won under such difficult conditions at that time.